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Another criticism concerns the rather dated sources which the authors
rely on in many instances. Most of the sources on rural-urban differ-
ences, for example, are decades old.' 6 These problems are rather mi-
nor, however, and the overall analysis is valid.
Policymaking and Politics in the Federal District Courts will be less
useful to practicing attorneys than to political scientists and scholars of
legal behavior. The latter groups are provided with a sophisticated em-
pirical study of a relatively unexplored area; the analysis of the impact
of the appointing president is especially important. Carp and Rowland
have made a significant contribution to the judicial behavior literature;
their book is an important study of the lower federal courts.
Neil D. McFeeley
DEATH PENALTIES, Raoul Berger. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass., 1982. pp. 242. $17.50.
In Death Penalties, ' noted constitutional scholar Raoul Berger crit-
ically analyzes the "abolitionist" thesis that capital punishment is
"cruel and unusual" and therefore violative of the eighth and four-
teenth amendments to the federal Constitution. Berger also criticizes
the Supreme Court for finding support in the eighth amendment for
judicial review of the proportionality of punishments to crimes. Before
inquiring into the meaning of the "cruel and unusual punishments"
clause, he decries the extension of the eighth amendment to the states,
arguing that both the Supreme Court's selective incorporation doctrine
and Justice Black's theory of en bloc incorporation are misguided.2 •
Berger's view is that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment-the vehicle of selective incorporation-is particularly ill-suited
to carry the eighth amendment over to the states because due process is
"procedural," whereas punishments are creatures of substantive law.3
Berger's analysis of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause
takes as its point of departure the fact that capital punishment was not
understood to be cruel and unusual per se in 1791, the year of the ratifi-
16. See id at 118-25.
1. R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES (1982).
2. Id at 10-18.
3. Id at 18-28.
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cation of the Bill of Rights.4 In addition to the fact that the states and
the federal sovereign recognized numerous categories of capital offense
in 1791, Berger cites the fifth-amendment guarantee that "no person
shall be. .. deprived of life. . . without due process of law" as evi-
dence that the Framers did not intend to disapprove the death penalty.5
Although the colonies were considerably less draconian than the Eng-
land of the "Bloody Code," the background against which the phrase
"no cruel or unusual punishments" originated, Berger relies chiefly
upon English history to support his claim that the eighth amendment
contains no principle of proportionality in sentencing.6 Two conclu-
sions follow, in his view: First, capital punishment cannot be cruel and
unusual in a constitutional sense; second, proportionality review of
state sentences and sentencing procedures by the Supreme Court is an
unconstitutional usurpation of legislative power by the federal judici-
ary. The first conclusion refutes the abolitionists on the Court, whose
number has now dwindled to two; the second conclusion rebukes the
Court itself for making proportionality review an element of its eighth-
amendment jurisprudence.
Berger's conclusions are mediated by a theory of constitutional ad-
judication, which he expounds here and elsewhere. 7 The theory rests
upon two premises. The first is that the Constitution is fundamentally
an allocation of power, derived ultimately from the people, between
competing entities: the states and the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of the federal government.8 The second premise is that key
phraseology in the Bill of Rights--"due process," "cruel and unusual
4. Id at 43-49. Berger is not entirely clear as to the exact date with reference to which the
meaning of the "no cruel and unusual punishments" clause is to be fixed. The years 1689, the year
of the adoption of the English Bill of Rights, and 1790, the year in which the first Congress passed
the Act of April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 115, providing a death penalty for certain federal offenses, figure
prominently in Berger's discussion. For the sake of convenience, I refer to the year 1791, the year
that Bill of Rights was ratified, throughout.
5. Id at 46-47. Berger argues that to deny that the death penalty is exempt from the eighth
amendment "is to render those [fifth amendment due process] safeguards useless. For in the ab-
sence of death penalties there was no need for the safeguards." Berger overlooks the fact that the
Constitution defines but one substantive offense, treason, U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3, cl. 1, and
prescribes no punishment for it. Presumably, then, Congress might have elected not to define any
substantive offenses and not to penalize the one substantive offense defined in the Constitution.
Would that contingency have rendered the due process clause "useless"? Certainly not, for due
process still would govern in the event that Congress chose to define crimes and enact punish-
ments. Of course, if the Framers intended that it be conceptually impossible for the death penalty
to withstand the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, then the reference in the fifth
amendment to deprivation of life would have been otiose; but, as Berger would readily concede,
such was not the Framers' intention.
6. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 40-41, 114-15.
7. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
8. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 78-79, 194.
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punishments"-had a fixed, specifically ascertainable meaning at com-
mon law, which the Framers intended to incorporate into the Constitu-
tion with all its fixity and specificity,9 and which the Framers of the
fourteenth amendment had no wish to disturb. 10 Given that the death
penalty was not considered in 1791 to be cruel and unusual, it follows,
for Berger, that the death penalty is not so now. Given that the Consti-
tution is essentially a scheme allocating power, it follows, for him, that
a novel judicial reading of fixed common law phraseology is a
usurpation.
The persuasiveness of Berger's conclusions rests heavily upon that
of his second premise. His claim is that the Framers intended the
phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" to apply to all and only those
punishments thought to be "barbarous""' in 1791, that is, to a list
which would include crucifixion and boiling in oil, but not disembow-
elment while alive.' 2 The Framers chose to use the phrase "cruel and
unusual," rather than to list punishments contemporaneously thought
barbarous because, in Berger's view, "to express all that was implicated
• . . would have required prolix detail unsuited to a Constitution."' 3
Berger's second premise is unconvincing for two reasons. The first
is that it is inconsistent with the generality of application that principles
must have. Berger is aware of the difficulty, but attempts to elude it by
a distinction:
Of course the Fourth Amendment "search and seizure" principle, for
example, goes beyond physical searches to comprehend current wire-
taps and electronic surveillance. They are analogous to what was
prohibited and illustrate the application of a principle to similar
facts. Very different is the abolitionist reading of the cruel and unu-
sual punishments clause-that clause did not prohibit death penal-
ties .... Consequently [the abolitionist is] not giving a "wider
application" to an accepted principle but replacing the princiole with
its own opposite.' 4
Berger's reply is oblivious to the fact that what is not cruel and unusual
at one time may become so later, and may become so not because the
standard has been altered but because the properties of the punishment
itself, in its social context, may change. The eighteenth century gener-
ally regarded death as but a passage to another and possibly quite
pleasanter mode of existence; the twentieth century, on the other hand,
9. Id at 59-76.
10. fd at 50-58.
11. Id at44.
12. Id at 41.
13. Id at 62.
14. Id at 73 (emphasis in original).
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takes much more seriously the thought that individuals do not survive
"biological" death. 15 Berger, at one point, betrays an awareness that
what is unusual at one time need not be so at another, but insists that
"unusual" in its constitutional sense must mean what was unusual in
1791.16
Another weakness in Berger's reply is that it approves judicial
analogies to "similar facts" without acknowledging the depth of this
concession. Is death by electrocution more like disembowelment while
alive, or is it more like boiling in oil? If Berger intends to allow the
Court to decide what is "analogous" to "similar facts" where post-1791
forms of punishment are concerned, then he must give up his claim that
judicial review becomes usurpation as soon as it goes beyond the Fram-
ers' particular intentions. As it happens, the commonest means of exe-
cution today were unknown in 1791.
Berger's second premise is unconvincing for another reason. If
Berger is right about the meaning of key constitutional phraseology,
then it follows that the Framers intended to insulate their detailed gov-
ernmental scheme both from interpretation in light of moral philoso-
phy and from amendment by mere majorities. Berger is quick to fault
activists for failing to confront the "countermajoritarian" difficulty I7
that besets their theory of judicial review, but he is not greatly troubled
by the equally serious difficulty of rationalizing our constitutionalism,
under which the wishes of a group of white males, numbering in the
tens of thousands and now dead nearly two centuries, can override the
preferences of diverse contemporary majorities numbering in the mil-
15. I owe this example to Professor Walter Dellinger. Ronald Dworkin would warn "aboli-
tionists" not to ignore his distinction between "concepts" and "conceptions," R. DWORKIN, TAK-
ING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1977), for, otherwise, they "are forced to argue in a vulnerable
way. They say that ideas of cruelty change over time ... [but] this suggests that the Court must
change what the Constitution enacted." Id at 136. Dworkin anticipates Berger's argument, and
appears to believe that the "concepts-conceptions" distinction is necessary in order to deflect it.
The present point is that the death penalty must be measured anew because our knowledge of its
causal powers, natural and supernatural, has changed. Dworkin might prefer to say that our
secular metaphysics lends itself to a liberalized conception of cruelty, but this language suggests
that a merely interior, subjective shift is at issue.
It should also be mentioned that in 1791 the penitentiary was at most an experimental alter-
native to corporal punishments. Market Hill, the first American prison, was founded in Philadel-
phia in 1790. As the colonies-turned-states enacted criminal codes more lenient than the British,
they began in earnest to construct prisons. B. MCKELvEY, AMERICAN PRISONS 1-9 (1936). Life
imprisonment, which today is the commonest alternative to execution, did not become feasible
until the penitentiary movement had established itself. See generally M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE
AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 114-31 (A. Sheridan, trans. 1977).
16. Id at 41.
17. Id. at 103-04.
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lions.' 8 Berger recognizes that constitutional provisions impose re-
straints on the freedom to govern, but he appears to believe that
adherence to the narrowest canons of construction removes the diffi-
culty. I9 It does not, for the difficulty is in fact aggravated if the ex-
pounders of a constitution are denied the resources of the subsequent
moral and political experience of the culture. The idea that legitimacy
of positive law is ultimately drawn from something beyond itself is
hardly novel.20 Berger's belief is that the "Constitution is certain and
fixed; it contains the permanent will of the people."' 2' He derides Jus-
tice McKenna's concept of "public opinion. . . enlightened by a hu-
mane justice"22 as mysticism, yet his own notion of a "permanent will
of the people" seems no less mystical and fails to explain why the "will
of the people" in 1791 should command the obedience of contrary-
minded majorities today, or even that of contrary-minded minorities in
1791. The difficulty is at least somewhat mitigated if the Framers are
understood to have intended-by their audacity in proposing a consti-
tution, if by nothing else-that the document be read by the light of the
accumulated experience and emerging conscience of humankind.
Berger is most convincing in his criticism 23 of the Supreme Court's
tortuous route from McGautha v. California,2 4 which held that the four-
teenth amendment does not permit unguided jury discretion in choos-
ing to impose a death sentence, to Lockett v. Ohio,25 in which the
plurality wrote that the eighth amendment requires that the jury be
able to consider any mitigating factor or circumstance in exercising its
discretion. The moral Berger draws from the story is that the Court is
incapable practically, as well as incompetent constitutionally, to deter-
18. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) 11; Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 225 (1980); See also Oliphant, To ward a New ERA?
35 NAT'L REV. 742, 742 (1983) ("Amending the Constitution is just shy of impossible. Of some
nine thousand constitutional amendments that have been introduced in Congress, only 26 have
been ratified-i I of them in the Eighteenth Century)."
19. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 49.
20. See, e.g., Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REv. 630, 638-48 (1958). Cf. Wechsler, To ward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1959) (legitimacy ofjudicial review inheres in principled quality of the Court's
decision-a "principled decision" being one that "rests on reasons that in their generality and
their neutrality transcend any immediate result").
21. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 66 (quoting Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
303, 308 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795)) (Berger's emphasis).
22. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 59-60 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378
(1910)).
23. Id at 127-52.
24. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
25. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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mine what is demanded by the society's "evolving sense of decency. '26
An abolitionist does not concede much, however, by confessing that the
formula "no cruel and unusual punishments" does not gain anything
from the gloss, "as measured by society's 'evolving sense of de-
cency.' "27 After all, Brown v. Board of Education28 reached its result
by measuring segregation directly against the standard of equal protec-
tion, without explicitly considering whether society's sense of decency
had sufficiently evolved to dictate the same answer. Arguably, it had
not. If the Supreme Court ever does hold the death penalty to be un-
constitutional, it could well do so by directly confronting the simple
question, "Is this cruel and unusual punishment?", leaving society's
sense of decency to catch up if necessary.
Berger argues that it would be proper under the exceptions
clause29 for Congress to curb the Court's excesses by removing state
punishments, and proportionality review thereof, from the Court's ju-
risdiction.30 This raises constitutional issues that range far beyond the
specific question of capital punishment, but here, as elsewhere, the au-
thor's analysis is provocative, abundantly researched, and, in certain
respects, unquestionably sound.3 1
William A. Edmundson
26. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 152 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
27. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Berger's view of the exceptions clause has been in flux.
Compare R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 289 (1969) ("[D]iscussion of the excep-
tions power in the Ratification conventions revolved almost exclusively about the retrial of facts
found by a jury. . . . There was not the faintest intimation . . . that the 'exceptions' clause was
designed to enable Congress to withdraw jurisdiction to declare an Act of Congress void.") with R.
BERGER, supra note 1, at 162 ("The Framers preoccupation with safeguarding jury findings from
revision by the court is unaccompanied by overtones of exclusivity.").
30. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 153-72, 201-04.
31. Thanks are due to Professor Walter Pratt, who commented on an early draft of this
review.
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